Privilege escalation, why should I care?
In my day job I spend about 90% of my time on the red team, performing vulnerability assessment and penetration testing. The rest is spent on threat research, incident response, and digital forensics. Interacting with clients as a consultant I often hear what I term 'interesting' responses. When a penetration tester calls something interesting you should probably pay attention :)
The IDS only listens external to the firewall? SharePoint is directly exposed to the Internet? The WAF protects against attacks therefore we don't have to fix the application? The VMs are all physically on the same host? The DMZ and the internal VLAN are physically on the same switch? You don't bother with privilege escalation patches? All quite interesting.
One of the responses I have heard multiple times is that privilege escalation vulnerabilities are a low priority because they require the attacker have local access. Meaning that that would be very difficult to pull off, therefore we don't have to worry about it. This also assumes that every single account holder is 100% gruntled all of the time, and that nobody ever makes a mistake. Meaning that we can trust everyone who accesses our networks and applications. Which I also find to be 'interesting' :)
There are multiple types of privilege attacks. The first is privilege escalation, where someone who has valid credentials or means to access a network or application can raise their level of access to a more privileged level. Like getting root on a Unix system for example, or becoming Domain admin before lunch on day 1, or assuming a higher role within an application. Impersonation attacks are similar however they entail becoming a different user, often with the same level of privilege, but with way more money in their account :) which soon finds its way to a non-extradition treaty country.
If the major difference between a remote exploit and a local one is that a network connection is required for the former, and not for the latter, does this mean that local priv escalation attacks cannot be performed across the network? Actually no. If an attacker can gain access to a system through a client side exploit, they may then effectively become the local user, and escalate to local system. Local system priv on a Windows computer is just a hop, skip, and jump away from being Domain administrator.
In a recent discussion about the priority to be assigned to patch one comment was "It's only a privilege escalation!". Yes, you are correct, and that is an interesting statement was my response.
Cheers,
Adrien de Beaupré
Intru-shun.ca Inc.
My SANS Teaching Schedule
Comments
Jim C
May 22nd 2013
1 decade ago
Adrien de Beaupre
May 22nd 2013
1 decade ago
tomsu
May 22nd 2013
1 decade ago
Great posting. I think you address something that is at the heart of our challenge as InfoSec professionals: admins and other "IT Professionals" do not think past one dimensional, and single event/step issues. They often fail to see the 'domino effect' of single weaknesses, nor do they see the multiple vectors from which an vulnerability can be exploited. More than half our job is to educate data and system owners of these. InfoSec truly is a collaborative discipline.
Ferret
May 22nd 2013
1 decade ago
If they choose not to flat out not patch or mitigate the vuln at all...now that I would find interesting.
Noot
May 22nd 2013
1 decade ago
The production servers are isolated and even interior is hard to get at because I went way out of my way to make it so. Compromising the domain controller (which is not under my control) will not easily breach the production servers, and unless the attacker has been here for awhile he won't find out how. I worry more about certain engineers' workstations who haven't learned what it means to pick a strong password and have access to production.
Joshua
May 22nd 2013
1 decade ago
Adrien de Beaupre
May 22nd 2013
1 decade ago
Adrien de Beaupre
May 22nd 2013
1 decade ago
Adrien de Beaupre
May 22nd 2013
1 decade ago
KZ
May 22nd 2013
1 decade ago